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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





         Petitioner
    v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES,
         Respondent
____________
On Petition for Review from an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A93-457-029)
Immigration Judge:  Mirlande Tadal
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   July 9, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
2Jagsir Singh is a native and citizen of India.  He petitions for review of a final
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an
Immigration Judge (IJ) denying him reentry into the United States and ordering his
removal.  The main issue before us is whether Singh possessed valid documentation
precluding his removal.  Because we conclude that Singh was not in possession of such
documents, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
After living in the United States for several years, on September 25, 2005, Singh
filed an Application for Status as a Temporary Resident (Form I-687) under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a.  On November 9,
2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Singh an authorization for
advance parole (Form I-512), which conditionally allowed him reentry into the United
States to pursue his Form I-687.  Six days later, DHS sent a letter to Singh’s attorney
notifying him of its intent to deny Singh’s Form I-687 if additional documentation
required by INA § 245A was not presented within 30 days.  Receiving no response from
Singh, DHS sent a Notice of Decision to Singh’s attorney on January 30, 2006 denying
Singh’s Form I-687 application, which stated, inter alia:  “Any Employment
On January 31, 2007, we issued an order that, inter alia, denied Singh’s motion to1
compel DHS’s submission of a full and complete administrative record.  Insofar as Singh
reasserts that argument in his merits brief, we will not revisit it.
3
Authorization Documents and/or I-512 Travel Documents already approved based upon
your pending I-687 application are hereby revoked.”
Apparently believing that his Form I-512 remained in effect, Singh left the United
States and went back to India on February 15, 2006.  Upon his return on April 15, 2006,
DHS initiated removal proceedings against him by issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA),
charging him as inadmissable under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for failing to produce valid entry documentation.  According to
Singh, he filed a motion to “reopen” his Form I-687 with DHS, though exactly when he
filed it remains a mystery.  See note 2, infra.
At the removal hearing before the IJ, Singh denied DHS’s charge, claiming that
neither he nor his attorney ever received notification stating that DHS had intended to
deny his Form I-687 in November 2005 or that DHS had in fact denied it in January 2006. 
However, the IJ disbelieved Singh and ruled that the denial automatically voided his
employment authorization and travel documents, thereby subjecting him to removal. 
Singh appealed to the BIA, which affirmed.  Singh’s timely petition for review followed.1
II.
We uphold the BIA’s factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing INS v. Elias-
4Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1 (1992)).  “[W]e review the BIA’s legal determinations
de novo, subject to established principles of deference.”  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347,
349 (3d Cir. 2004).
Addressing each of Singh’s arguments, we first reject the argument that he
possessed valid reentry documents.  Because DHS’s January 30, 2006 Notice of Decision
denied Singh’s Form I-687 application before he departed the United States for India, the
regulations excusing valid reentry documentation are inapplicable because they apply
only to applications that are then pending.  See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(1).  None of the
Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act (LIFE Act) provisions that Singh cites changes
that result.  See id. § 245a.13(a) (protecting applicants only “until a final determination on
his or her application has been made”); id. § 245a.13(e) (protecting only applicants who
“[t]ravel while the application is pending”).  Further, although the temporary resident
status regulations do not squarely answer this question, the regulations covering
applications for permanent resident status state that “[i]f the adjustment application of an
individual granted advance parole is subsequently denied the individual will be treated as
an applicant for admission, and subject to the provisions of section 212 and 235 of the
[INA].”  Id. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(A); accord id. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(B).  Therefore, we do not
believe that Singh may resort to DHS’s November 5, 2005 advance parole authorization
to trump its subsequent letter of intent to deny his application for temporary resident
status and the actual Notice of Decision to deny.
Singh also claims that the NTA constituted selective prosecution.  We find no2
factual basis whatsoever for this argument.  Indeed, Singh’s brief states that DHS “should
have refrained to issue the [NTA] as to do so would be improvident as the Petitioner’s
motion to reopen had been filed . . . .”  But this statement is contradicted by Singh’s
attorney’s testimony before the IJ that he filed the motion to reopen on May 8, 2006,
which was after the NTA’s date of April 15, 2006.
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This is especially true when substantial evidence shows that Singh’s attorney
received these subsequent notices before Singh departed for India on February 15, 2006. 
See Bejar v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he regulations make clear
that when an alien is represented, service on the alien’s attorney constitutes notice to the
alien.”).  In sum, once DHS sent his attorney its January 30, 2006 Notice of Decision,
(1) Singh’s Form I-687 application was no longer “pending”; (2) Singh became subject to
INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), anew; and (3) Singh could no
longer rely on the revoked Form I-512 as a valid entry document.
Second, with respect to his alleged motion to reopen, even assuming arguendo that
Singh did in fact file such a motion, it would not have altered his status.  Unlike motions
to reopen filed with the BIA or the IJ, a motion to reopen a Form I-687 denial filed with
DHS cannot be considered.  8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(q) (“Motions to reopen a proceeding or
reconsider a decision shall not be considered under this part.”).2
Finally, we reject Singh’s various due process-type arguments.  Even assuming
arguendo that Form I-512 must provide a warning to the alien that he would be subject to
removal if his Form I-687 application is denied before he departs, we find that the
6authorization issued in this case sufficiently warned Singh that “if you are excludable
under any part of section 212(a) of the [INA] whose provisions may not be waived, you
may be ineligible for legalization and may be subject to removal proceedings and/or
expedited removal at the port-of-entry.”  In addition, the IJ’s omission of Singh’s country
for removal in her written order does not render it “fundamentally flawed,” as Singh
would have been removed to the country from which his trip to the United States
originated, India.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1)(A).
III.
Having considered all of Singh’s arguments and finding that no further discussion
is necessary, we will deny his petition for review.
